The ‘Unknown Knowns’ of the Global Gas Market. CEPS Essay No. 16, 16 October 2014 by Natali, Paolo
  
Paolo Natali, Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA), SciencesPo. 
CEPS Essays offer scholarly observations and personal insights into topics of critical 
importance in European affairs. The views expressed are attributable only to the author 
in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) 
© Paolo Natali, 2014 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
 
The ‘Unknown Knowns’ of the 
Global Gas Market 
Paolo Natali 
No. 16 / 16 October 2014 
Abstract. Energy markets evolve at least as quickly as the economies they fuel. But development 
unfolds at an irregular pace, with starts and stops often precipitated by seemingly unpredictable 
dynamics. Is it really impossible to forecast these ‘revolutions’, if the past can be seen as prologue? 
The answer might be in the way we look at future events; even if we accept that some events are 
unpredictable, we may be able to infer much more about the future trends through a broader reading 
of available data, thus revealing ‘unknown knowns’ that may be useful in understanding paradigm 
shifts ahead. This paper presents an analysis of the global gas market, offering views on what the most 
relevant ‘unknown knowns’ of today look like, and hypotheses about some of the possible game-
changing events that the market is likely  to face in the short to medium term. 
 
en years ago the ban on crude oil exports from the United States, which had been in 
place since 1975, was still an agreeable security proposition to uphold: perhaps the 
country no longer felt threatened by a foreign supply shock like the one of 1973, but 
its status as a significant net importer allowed it to absorb all the domestic product without 
the risk of triggering a downward price spiral that would have killed domestic investment. 
Within a decade, the tide has turned: domestic supply is hugely on the rise, and the 
government is realising that the price tag of an export ban may no longer be justifiable on 
the same security grounds.1 This story reveals how quickly the face of the energy industry 
can change in the wake of events. 
                                                     
1 Blake Clayton (2013), The Case for Allowing U.S. Crude Oil Exports, Policy Innovation Memorandum 
No. 34, Council on Foreign Relations, July (http://www.cfr.org/oil/case-allowing-us-crude-oil-
exports/p31005). 
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Constant change in energy markets is no big news: the dynamism of the energy sector is 
simply the mirror of the fast-evolving trends of today’s industrial economies, as well as of 
the aspiration of not yet fully industrial economies to complete the transition themselves. 
This industrialisation pattern, with first-comers reaping positional benefits and second-
comers poised to close the gap,2 also explains the dominance of hydrocarbons as the energy 
source of choice: industrial economies, at least as we know them, require centralised 
production 3  and the most flexible possible transportation of raw materials and 
manufactured goods in order to remove trade barriers. Coal and oil are relatively cheap, 
storable, and easy to move around; and in regions where appropriate infrastructure has 
been developed, the same applies to gas. One may debate which is the cause and which the 
effect, but it is a fact that the industrial revolution was first possible in the UK thanks to a 
coal-intensive application; the steam engine. The inextricable link between the industrial 
economy and hydrocarbons has changed little over centuries, given today’s debate over the 
need for industrialising regions to be left free to power their growth with cheap energy, 
which still means coal. History is full of such relations, and it is often said that what is past is 
prologue. Why then is it so difficult to predict future trends in this field? 
The answer might have to do with the conceptual framework we usually deploy when 
looking ahead. Former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, famously warned the 
policy community against neglecting “unknown unknowns”. There are things we know we 
know, he explained, and things we know we don’t know; these are controllable, as we know 
at least something about them. It is the things we don’t even know the existence of, the 
“unknown unknowns” that we cannot control and that will catch us by surprise when we 
least expect it.4 All-encompassing as it may have appeared, one slice of that categorisation 
was missing: is it not logical to assume that there may also be things that we don’t know we 
know? Slavoj Žižek raised the question, only to come to the conclusion that “unknown 
knowns” are basically the unconscious that underpins a society or a policy.5 This is a good 
observation, although it is not comprehensive, in that unknown knowns may also emerge as 
a result of information that we are perfectly conscious of, but that we have not connected in 
a causal way. 
This rather philosophical point has, in fact, profound practical implications. Industrial 
development takes place via incentives and disincentives determined by the advantages and 
drawbacks of different paths – just as the already described match between hydrocarbons 
                                                     
2  Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), Economic backwardness in historical perspective, a book of essays, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
3 Alfred Marshall’s Industry and Trade (1919) provides a compelling and still very relevant explanation 
of how the optimal size of the business unit, especially in heavy industry, is influenced by a multitude 
of factors, most of them ultimately revolving around economies of scale. On energy input, Marshall 
observes that “[…] the individual masses to be handled have mostly become so bulky that every 
operation must be performed by mechanical force: and thus a new economy arises from increase of 
size.” 
4 “There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; 
that is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns – there are things we do not know we don’t know.” US Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, at a press conference in Washington, D.C. on 12 February 2002, addressing the absence of 
evidence for the development of weapons of mass destruction by the Iraqi regime. 
5 “[...] the Abu Ghraib scandal shows that the main dangers lie in the ‘unknown knowns’ – the 
disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though 
they form the background of our public values.” Slavoj Žižek (2004), “What Rumsfeld Doesn't Know 
that He Knows about Abu Ghraib”, In These Times, 17 September. 
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and centralised production. These connections are known in advance; yet, they are not 
always used to determine the likelihood of scenarios. This paper tries to outline the current 
unknown knowns of a specific industrial sector that is of particular prominence in many of 
today’s outstanding debates on the future of energy sources: the global gas market. 
What we know about the unknown 
Every attempt at predicting markets is exposed to the unpredictable nature of certain game-
changing events, which determine discrete shifts in its fundamentals: these are commonly 
dubbed ‘revolutions’. Frequent though they are, they remain difficult to predict – despite 
often appearing almost obvious in hindsight. They can be caused by two different categories 
of events.  
Unknown knowns 
Should it not have been clear to any reasonable observer that unpegging the dollar from 
gold would raise questions about the actual value of the currency and this, combined with 
tensions in the Middle East, would ultimately lead to what is now known as the 1973 oil 
shock? And yet, everyone was caught by surprise. The occurrence of this type of event is not 
obvious, because most actors and observers suffer from a strong path dependency, which 
makes it difficult for them to imagine scenarios too different from what the common 
discourse considers possible. But before their occurrence they were ‘unknown knowns’, in 
that the elements – that would have enabled their prediction – were already available in the 
public domain. Trying to join the dots in a more creative way is an exercise that should be 
done much more extensively. For example, the price of gold has dropped by 30% over the 
last two years, seemingly breaking a long-term correlation with the oil price. Was that 
causation? In which direction? Why was it broken and what would it take to restore it? 
Attempting to answer these questions leads towards a deeper understanding of the 
interactions among currently available information; it might lead to revealing an unknown 
known. 
Normal accidents 
Another, more sudden cause of discrete changes are technological breakthroughs. To 
reinterpret a concept proposed by Charles Perrow, these events are similar to “normal 
accidents”, in other words, events that are likely to occur despite the impossibility of 
predicting them.6 Contrary to popular belief, the production of shale gas in the US has been 
going on for decades; the reason why it grew by 71% year on year in 2008 was that in 
previous years new exploration technologies allowed geologists to find out that the reserve 
figures for the largest shale ‘plays’ (regions) in the country had been grossly underestimated 
– in other words there was ten-times more gas under the continent than had previously been 
thought. This has changed the gas market in North America, and possibly globally, forever, 
with wide implications for world politics.7 
                                                     
6 Perrow created the concept of “normal accident” in order to explain why the likelihood of a nuclear 
accident is higher than expected, but the same notion can be applied to the likelihood of predicting a 
technological breakthrough. Charles Perrow (1999), Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk 
Technologies, Princeton University Press. 
7 Edward L. Morse (2014), “Welcome to the Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, May/June. 
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Breakthroughs can stem from disasters too: the nuclear incident at the Fukushima plant in 
early 2011 matched Perrow’s definition of a “normal accident” – including the actual 
likelihood of it happening, roughly, within the predicted time framework.8 It had immediate 
and important effects on energy markets globally: despite it being neither the first nor the 
most devastating among this type of incidents, it came at a very unexpected time and 
location, and the surprise effect spurred enough fear to lead several countries to reconsider 
their own nuclear programs. Evidently there had been some degree of overconfidence in the 
safety of nuclear power technology, suddenly public opinion woke up to that reality and the 
course of history changed direction.9 
Revolutions 
Unknown knowns and normal accidents may give rise to so-called ‘revolutions’. Normal 
accidents escape prediction, nor may one use an unknown known to tell for sure how and 
when it will trigger a revolution. Even so, once a revolution has started, events do not 
necessarily unfold in unpredictable ways. Most often their development is itself an 
unknown known. For instance, one can be moderately confident that, sooner or later, 
someone will find out how to store large volumes of electricity cheaply and in an 
environmentally sustainable way. At that stage, there will be important consequences for the 
role of hydrocarbons, as storage will presumably become the backup source of choice, and 
this will reduce the need for gas-fired power plants used during peak demand, capacity 
payments and so forth. One would think that the big players have clear strategies in place in 
order to defend their market positions when this revolution takes place. Odds are they 
don’t. 
Currently available information provides at least some general indication as to where an 
industry will be heading as technology, relative prosperity and the aspirations of societies 
evolve. In the case of the global gas market, the trends emerging from the present junction 
allow us to identify some evident future developments. Their components are well known, 
but the industry is somewhat hesitant in drawing the logical conclusions from them: they 
are, in other words, unknown knowns. A few of these are presented below. 
The weight of natural gas in the electricity mix will grow 
Quite unlike 2014, the year 2013 began with a record long and harsh winter in Europe. By 
mid-March, many EU countries were running out of gas in storage, and the spot price at the 
hubs reflected this reality. LNG cargoes from time to time became the marginal source of 
supply and that gave rise to a sort of game of musical chairs, sending prices even higher. 
Many wholesale players found themselves in trouble, and there have been several instances 
of utility companies raising consumer tariffs in order to offset the increased financial 
distress. The policy lesson of this event is that natural gas has been treated as belonging to 
the dirty side of the energy mix, due to its carbon impact; but without the possibility to have 
an entirely renewable mix, it remains a major baseload source, as well as a necessary 
complement to intermittent generation thanks to its flexibility, and it is still rather cleaner 
                                                     
8 “[…] the probability of a nuclear plant meltdown with dispersion of radioactive materials to the 
atmosphere is not one chance in a million a year, but more like one chance in the next decade.” 
Perrow (1999), op. cit. 
9 The history of finance is full of such events and refers to them as “black swans”, which can be seen 
as a parallel to Perrow’s “normal accidents”. 
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than coal. In a cold winter, given that its environmental ambitions rule out coal, Western 
economies cannot do without natural gas at present. 
Accordingly, price incentives and policy converged in sending signals for the gas industry to 
expand. Several OECD countries have responded with a substantial coal to gas switch – the 
US and Japan in particular, each for different reasons – while Europe has been somewhat 
trapped between a market dominated by long-term contracts, fragmented hubs and 
transportation systems, and a policy discourse that has struggled to re-admit natural gas 
into the debate as a legitimate component of the energy mix. Some countries like the UK, 
Germany and Italy have been quicker than others to realise the need for flexible, gas-fired 
generation and they have considered capacity mechanisms to foster the construction of 
capacity.. 
But Asia is responding much quicker, with gas consumption in East Asia increasing at a 
faster pace than in Europe and North America.10 Over time, this trend will also need to be 
multiplied by the fact that many Asian economies are growing at an annual pace closer to 
10% than to the 0-2%, which is the norm across the OECD area. This sustained demand, 
combined with Japan’s need for gas to cover the nuclear gap, provides the explanation to the 
skyrocketing LNG prices of East Asia. 
North America will soon become a net LNG exporter 
With such a focus on the least GHG emitting and polluting hydrocarbon, natural gas,11 and 
its more easily movable liquid counterpart, crude oil and its derivatives, the shale revolution 
came as a boon for the US and to an extent also for Canada. Within a decade, the US has 
become self-sufficient in natural gas,12 and oil might be next to follow.13 Besides stranding 
some LNG,14 the shale gas revolution also made North America gas abundant, and the 
depressed regional price at Henry Hub creates a strong rationale for LNG exports,15 which 
are going to be the next logical step. 
The very high Asian gas price offers the demand pull, and the abundance of shale gas within 
the US market will soon provide a supply push through LNG exports. A significant number 
of domestic and international companies have been looking into the creation of export 
                                                     
10 Warner ten Kate, Lászlo Varró and Anne-Sophie Corbeau (2013), Developing a Natural Gas Trading 
Hub in Asia: Obstacles and Opportunities, Partner Country Series, International Energy Agency. 
11 Natural gas is composed of around 90% methane, the simplest hydrocarbon and the one which, 
therefore, has the highest calorific value: this translates into the lowest CO2 emissions per unit. 
Natural gas is also the least polluting hydrocarbon in terms of emissions of NOx, SOx and 
particulates.   
12 The net imports figure is expected “to decline to 3.3 Bcf/d in 2014 and to 2.6 Bcf/d in 2015”, most of 
which are regional imports from Canada, given that LNG imports are expected to remain at minimal 
levels of 0.17 Bcf/d in both 2014 and 2015. EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, 12 August 2014, section 
on “Natural Gas”. 
13 Net imports of oil into the US are in sharp decline since a 2005 peak of 12.5 million bbl/d, and the 
year-on-year decline has sharpened since 2010, by about 1 million bbl/d each year. EIA (2013), op. 
cit., section on “Petroleum & Other Liquids”. 
14 Julian Critchlow and Sharad Apte (2013) (Bain & Company), How Shale Tilts the Scale. 
15  Charles Ebinger, Kevin Massy and Govinda Avasarala (2012), “Evaluating the Prospects for 
Increased Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas from the United States: An Interim Report”, The 
Brookings Energy Security Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
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capacity, with the first project potentially becoming operational by 2015.16 By the late 2020s, 
an important share of the growing North American domestic production could become 
available as LNG, with official estimates suggesting a figure of 45 bcm/yr by 2027, possibly 
to be reached much earlier in the decade.17 What has perhaps been underestimated is the 
momentum this process is going to create: US producers are currently experiencing financial 
difficulties, due to the very depressed domestic price environment, with many smaller 
independents deciding to shut in their production instead of fully exploiting the acreage.18 
With LNG exports acting as a pressure valve in the system, the Henry Hub price would go 
up again beyond the current break-even level, hence fostering more production, which in 
turn will make an even stronger case for further LNG capacity. This virtuous circle will only 
reach equilibrium once the LNG market is saturated. To discuss the saturation point of the 
LNG market is tantamount to discussing the demand growth potential of the Asian region, 
which at the moment is represented by a spot price twice as high as those prevailing at the 
European hubs, and one order of magnitude higher than Henry Hub. It will take a long time 
for LNG supply to match the demand growth rate, and until then, the Asian demand pool 
will absorb any additional supply, including the volumes originated in North America. 
There will be an interplay with new volumes from non-Gulf of Mexico production (Canada, 
Australia, Qatar) but this will only affect the pace of price adaptation, not the overall 
dynamics. 
The less obvious part of the North American LNG story is how developers would find the 
20-year justification they would need in order to build export facilities, in a market not 
liquid enough to guarantee price stability for long horizons. Nonetheless, a number of 
projects have been tabled, including some using cutting-edge technology such as floating 
LNG, whereby a terminal would be re-deployable for use elsewhere should Henry Hub 
prices rise too much. For these developers, the perceived obstacle seems to be more on the 
political than on the commercial side. 
But it is unlikely that North America will stop the prospects of LNG exports in the short to 
medium term, for three orders of reasons. First, two terminals in the US have so far been 
approved by the US regulator with one of them, Sabine Pass, already under construction;19 
and Canada approved 11 export licences to date, although no LNG terminal is under 
construction yet, with site approvals still pending. 20  The two countries will not find 
                                                     
16 This is the Sabine Pass liquefaction plant in Louisiana, owned by Cheniere Energy. 
17 It is useful to quote the evolution of the official EIA position on this topic. Annual Energy Outlook 
2011: “Although US LNG export projects have been proposed, their economic viability remains 
uncertain in view of the relatively inexpensive sources of natural gas supply available elsewhere in 
the world. As a result, existing liquefaction capacity in Alaska is the only source for US exports of 
LNG that is considered in the AEO2011 Reference case”. Annual Energy Outlook (2013), “US exports 
of LNG from domestic sources rise to approximately 1.6 trillion cubic feet in 2027”. 
18  Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed (2013), “The Great Oil Swindle”, Le Monde Diplomatique, March 
(http://mondediplo.com/2013/03/09gaz). 
19 Updated list of approved LNG import/export terminals is available at the US Federal Energy 
Research Commission (http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-approved.pdf). A list of 
proposed facilities is also available, featuring a number of potential export terminals to be built by the 
end of this decade (http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-proposed-potential.pdf). 
20  Updated list of approved LNG export licences at Canada’s National Energy Board 
(http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/lngxprtlcncpplctns/lngxprtlcncpplctns-
eng.html). 
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themselves competing in a Cournot duopoly:21 as far as export capacity is concerned, the US 
and Canada volumes taken together will be significant but still represent a minority in a 
global LNG market poised to grow. Even with additional competition from planned LNG 
projects in Australia and North Africa, the increased global supply is likely to just about 
match the strong Asian demand growth, rather than outpace it. A second case for LNG 
exports is that gas from remote locations such as Alaska and British Columbia would not 
have a cheap means of reaching the US demand centres, with LNG proving a commercially 
viable option instead. It is therefore expected that no significant policy restrictions will be 
put in place, and the decision will be left to market forces, with the consequence that the 
short-term production and export of natural resources will be maximised. Exports of LNG 
from North America are therefore poised to make a significant entry into the global gas 
market before the end of this decade. 
Shale gas will not remain an American exception 
The North American shale gas revolution took place thanks to technological improvement;22 
shale reservoirs of similar size and quality exist elsewhere on the planet. It would be naive to 
think of an American exceptionalism in the ability to apply the exploration methods that 
have made it possible to locate shale gas reserves, as well as in the willingness to exploit 
such reserves once they are found. Three regions ought to be mentioned here for potential 
medium-term developments: China/India, Latin America, and Europe. The production of 
shale gas in these regions is not so much a matter of political choice as a matter of time. 
That said, it will not be plain sailing: for a start, it will be much easier for the planned 
Chinese economy to fully exploit unconventional resources, than for the democratic, 
politically fragmented and environmentally aware Europe, or for shale gas-rich Latin 
American countries such as Brazil and Argentina, whose access to demand is less obvious. 
On a political level, China is much less worried about the drawbacks of unconventional 
production for the simple reason that in much of the country, population density is much 
lower, thus improving the possibility that unconventional discoveries be located in remote 
areas where the risk of water contamination would not imply threats to humans. The 
country’s attitude to environmental issues is also yet to be proven. India’s population is 
more evenly spread, nonetheless the country is undertaking significant shale gas 
exploration. Moreover, there is currently much less natural gas in the electricity mix in 
China and India than there is in Europe, Brazil or Argentina.23 This implies that an increase 
in gas generation would bring about much more dramatic environmental improvements in 
the coal-dominated Chinese and Indian mixes than in Europe. 
For its part, Europe cannot be treated as a uniform block. Despite the efforts of the European 
Commission and European Parliament to legislate on unconventional exploration, the issue 
                                                     
21 A Cournot duopoly is a type of market dominated by two actors, each making simultaneous and 
therefore independent decisions on the amount of output they will produce. It differs from the 
alternative to compete on pricing (the Bertrand duopoly). Duopolies tend to the Cournot model if 
output is difficult to adjust. In this case, ‘output’ is not LNG as such, but LNG liquefaction capacity. US 
and Canadian LNG ventures will make their investment decisions independently of each other, but 
will not turn into a duopoly due to the global nature of the LNG market.  
22 IHS CERA (2009), Fueling North America’s Energy Future: The Unconventional Natural Gas Revolution 
and the Carbon Agenda, special report. 
23 The share of gas-fired generation in the EU27 electricity mix is 23%, versus 4% for China. EIA data 
2012. Eurelectric 2011 for EU27. 
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remains very much one of national sovereignty, and the interests of the member states are 
vastly diverse. First of all, a number of countries have been left out of this debate for sheer 
lack of unconventional potential. Among the potentially gas abundant, it is not clear what 
the overall picture will look like and how much of Europe’s unconventional reserves will 
escape regulation, but it seems quite clear that in the end there will be some production in 
selected regions. The declining indigenous production of conventional hydrocarbons in 
many EU countries, which is matched by a growing import dependency,24 will be a key 
incentive in this development. 
Brazil and Argentina offer two interesting, although different, cases. Brazil’s energy mix is 
dominated by oil and biomass with only about one-tenth natural gas, hence offering a large 
switch potential, while Argentina is already half fuelled by natural gas, prospecting to 
become a major exporter of gas produced from shale reservoirs. In neither country will 
environmental concerns stop the development of shale gas, and the challenging investment 
atmosphere does not seem to be stopping the flurry of international companies rushing to 
acquire stakes in unconventional ventures in the region. 
Figure 1. Investment timescale for conventional and unconventional oil and gas ventures 
 
Sources: ExxonMobil, as part of an OGP presentation at the European Commission Workshop on Environmental, 
Economic, Climate and Energy Security Implications of Shale Gas in Europe, Brussels, 12/9/2011. 
Shale gas ventures will, of course, require a favourable investment environment. Shorter 
lead times and the ability to control production require less long-term exposure (see Figure 
1), thereby offering an investment timescale that is more favourable to smaller ventures. 
There is likely to be a reshaping of the upstream environment in all the regions with shale 
gas potential, with a larger role to be played by smaller, leveraged independents. Concerns 
have been raised as to the ability of the shale industry outside the US to source the necessary 
finance, and even the machinery25 required to reproduce the US shale revolution. These 
concerns, however, have an impact on timing, rather than on the actual likelihood that 
reserves will be exploited. A more complex concern exists around the drilling economics, 
and the prospects for shale production to ever become cash positive; but while this 
argument certainly applies to the US due to the currently depressed prices, it is unlikely that 
                                                     
24  Data on the growing import dependency are available from Eurostat 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
25  Ivan Sandrea (2014), US shale gas and tight oil industry performance: challenges and opportunities, 
Oxford Energy Comment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March. 
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it will apply the same way for shale ventures in locations where the production can be easily 
sold at more than twice the American price.  
Europe is too set in its ways to benefit from a shale-driven LNG market 
With the US turning into a net gas exporter and with global production growth, the supply 
side of the LNG market is expanding. Even so, the Asian price premium is essentially a 
measure of how much it remains short compared to the demand side (see Figure 2), as the 
new demand created by the Fukushima disaster, and the organic growth of Chinese and 
Indian demand, created an ideal outlet for the new volumes.  
Figure 2. Natural gas price trends 
 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2012). Argos, Heren, Platts front month prices (2014). 
Europe would benefit from the added optionality represented by American LNG 
diversifying its supply pool, and various politically charged claims to this effect have been 
made since the Ukrainian crisis gave rise to new concerns about Russian gas.  
The argument for having more LNG supply reaching Europe is twofold: one is that Russia 
has not proved a reliable supplier to everyone all the time, and diversification into LNG 
might be desirable, even at a ‘security premium’ over the price of the traditional sources of 
piped gas. The second rationale would be to provide arbitrage opportunities effectively 
working as a cap when hub prices fluctuate, which is already the case in countries where 
LNG terminals are present, but not so much in other countries, especially in Eastern Europe.  
As things stand, however, the Old Continent is not well placed to absorb any American 
LNG. European gas prices are somewhere between the high Asian price and the depressed 
Henry Hub. The European arena is somewhat less flexible due to the traditional reliance on 
long-term contracts, the latter effectively taking away large chunks on both market curves, 
leaving the observable prices to be determined by the minority of the gas that is actually 
traded at the hubs.26 Transport is also more complicated in the European continent than it is 
                                                     
26 As late as 2008, the proportion of oil-indexed to market-priced trade for the EU27 + Turkey + 
Switzerland was almost 3 to 1, with the total 563 bcm market size split into 442 bcm oil-indexed (i.e. 
as part of long-term contracts) and only 121 bcm priced on a gas hub, either part of long-term 
contracts or traded spot. (Anthony J. Melling (2010), Natural Gas Pricing and Its Future: Europe as the 
Battleground, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.) Since then, a period of contract 
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elsewhere: in much of the rest of the world, the only way to reach markets is LNG, a more 
expensive but ultimately simpler method of transport from an economic modelling 
perspective.27 European grids, on the other hand, are fragmented along national boundaries, 
with a typical entry/exit point structure and often rigid and complex methods for the 
allocation of transportation capacity,28 and lower regulated rates of return compared to the 
US.29 The direct consequence of this system for the present reasoning is that shippers often 
need to adopt a country-specific attitude with regard to the use of assets. This includes LNG 
regasification capacity: for instance, Spain built a large amount of such capacity over the last 
few years,30 while at the other end of the continent countries like Slovakia and Bulgaria are 
almost entirely dependent on Russian gas supply, which proved an energy security threat in 
the winter disputes of 2006 and 2009.31 However, Spanish LNG capacity is not able to work 
towards the common benefit of gas supply in the region, due to lack of reverse flow at the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
renegotiations has started: many of the long-term contracts that underpinned the development of the 
North Sea were either expiring or reaching renegotiation gates, and the dynamics of European gas 
pricing called for a realignment, in particular opening the possibility of gas hub indexation. As a 
result of this transition, it is estimated that since 2013 only the minority of overall European gas 
supply is still oil-indexed. This has led to an increase in hub liquidity, although it must be noted that 
the renegotiated gas-indexed contracts remain bilateral relationships – the implication being that the 
demand-supply balance, which determines the prevailing spot prices at European hubs, is likely to 
remain composed of a minority of the market. 
27 A producer entering a long-term relationship usually owns most of the transportation part of the 
value chain, i.e. the liquefaction facility and the cargoes. The delivery takes place ‘at beach’, where the 
customer has regasification and transport capacity in the pipeline system. This is simpler compared to 
a traditional European long-term contract with delivery ‘at hub’, which requires the producer to book 
matching transportation capacities in the transmission systems that the gas needs to cross before 
reaching the nominated hub. 
28 DNV KEMA (2013), Study on Entry-Exit Regimes in Gas, contracted by DG ENER, December. 
29  Tim Boersma (2012), Safeguarding Investments in Natural Gas Infrastructure: Lessons Learned from 
Regulatory Regimes in the United States and the European Union, Transatlantic Academy. 
30  GLE presentation to CEER LNG Workshop “LNG Terminals in Europe”, 6 September 2011 
(http://www.gie.eu/index.php/events-diary/workshops/gle-workshops/cat_view/16-gle-
workshops/33-2011-workshops/34-first-ceer-workshop-on-access-to-european-lng-terminals). 
31 The three days of physical cuts resulting from the 2006 crisis were limited to Ukraine and did not 
spread to any EU countries. The 2009 crisis was much more serious, with the cuts lasting for 20 days 
and its physical effects were felt beyond Ukraine in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Serbia (John Lough (2011), 
Russia’s Energy Diplomacy, Chatham House). Two things are worth noting: first, the supply shortage 
was initially solved not by political action, but by a private consortium among supply companies that 
took care of the costs of moving the gas (Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava (2009), The 
Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: A comprehensive assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies); second, Greece is also dependent on Russian gas for 82% of its demand, which translates 
into about 9 mcm/d during winter, but thanks to its Revithoussa LNG terminal, it was able to entirely 
offset the absence of Russian supply by using it at close to full capacity (12.6 mcm/d) for the duration 
of the crisis, unloading four cargoes on 10, 13, 16 and 20 January 2009 and even managing to export 
some of the extra supply to Bulgaria (Aleksandar Kovacevic (2009), The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine 
Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March; Pierre Noël and Sachi 
Findlater (2010), “Measuring Gas Supply Security: An Indicator for Russia-Dependent Europe”, 
University of Cambridge EPRG, presentation, 31 May). These two observations do not change the 
assessment that there was a security of supply problem, but perhaps offers a useful hint as to what 
type of risk mitigation should be put in place. 
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land entry points from France.32 Hypothetical LNG supply unloaded at Bilbao (point 314 in 
Figure 3) would have to cross five balancing zones, acquiring the relevant entry/exit 
capacities, to reach the Austrian exit point at Baumgarten into Slovakia (point 46).33 
Figure 3. Natural gas pipelines and entry/exit points in continental Europe (detail) 
 
Source: ENTSO-G, The European Natural Gas Network, April 2014. 
The paradoxical result is that at the same time as half of Spain’s LNG import capacity sits 
unused, most of Eastern Europe is suffering import dependency from one single supplier. 
Nor is the market alone seemingly able to fix the problem: the marginal buyer at the hub is 
an opportunistic arbitrager, and LNG capacity acts as a cap on hub prices even when it is 
unused: hence it would be very uncommon for a hub to actually send a price signal for 
foreign LNG capacity to be used – at least as long as regulation makes it complicated to do 
so. 
Europe’s problem is that national sovereignty still largely rules its energy markets extent, 
and the borders of nation states are too narrow to address any of the dynamics above. First 
of all, many large corporations are present in all of them: the sheer volumes they are able to 
bring in exerts a strong influence on policy-makers, and large companies obviously thrive in 
a system whose complexity works as an entry barrier to small entrants. Secondly, 
availability of transport capacity in primary and secondary markets across Europe varies 
widely, as do auction calendars, product types and durations. 
                                                     
32 The current entry points into Spain are indicated by the yellow markers 32 and 33 in Figure 3: the 
bulk of the imported volumes pass through Col de Larrau (no. 32) which has a capacity of 165 
GWh/day, while Biriatou (no. 33) is ancillary with only 10 GWh/day. Both are bidirectional, but the 
reverse flow capacity is never used in practice. The relevant Spanish and French TSOs are making an 
attempt at a virtual FR-ES trading point at Larrau, starting from 2015, to try and enable this. 
33 In Figure 3, the balancing zones to be crossed are Peg-TIGF (410), Peg-Sud (409), Peg-Nord (408), 
NCG (404) and CEGH (414) or VOB (405). In reality, in the event of a shortage of Russian supply 
reaching Baumgarten, it might be enough for Spanish LNG to physically flow into France and 
alleviate the westbound flow, which as a domino effect would create virtual supply at CEGH. There 
are a number of similar bottlenecks across the continent. 
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The idiosyncrasy between this state of affairs and the interdependence of European energy 
markets will not be solved anytime soon. As a result, the most likely outcomes are a 
persistence of the current, unattractive environment for LNG supplies; a push toward the 
new build of LNG terminals located on the eastern side of the Mediterranean and the Baltic 
states, on security of supply grounds; a focus on natural gas from the Caspian region and 
eastern Mediterranean instead of LNG; a continuation of the slow integration of the 
continental gas market via European Union regulation, namely the tabling of a Fourth 
Package for market liberalisation enshrining a piecemeal approach to the problem, fostering 
cross-border measures, bundled capacity products and so forth. 
In this scenario, the possibility to lock in the benefits of increased LNG availability during 
the current decade will not materialise, as the price of LNG itself summed up to the 
transportation cost into central European hubs, given the present capacity constraints, will 
remain significantly higher than hub prices. Asia, therefore, despite its lack of hub liquidity 
and transparent price signals, is poised to remain the main demand centre for LNG for the 
time being. 
Some implications for regional markets and policy directions 
This simple study of a few evident unknown knowns at play in the global gas market was 
conducted by trying to identify latent knowledge and prolonging the effects of existing 
trends into the near future. Sure enough, normal accidents will also keep taking place, 
outdating the analysis in any of its parts: the fuzzy combination of events and trends leading 
to a normal accident does not belong to the realm of latent knowledge, and therefore 
observers cannot extrapolate them from their own knowledge in a Socratic way, as is the 
case with unknown knowns. 
If the ability to see into the future cannot be improved, is there a way to at least get ready for 
some of the possible scenarios, pre-empting any downsides or maximising the benefit of any 
upsides? Hedging against predictable risks is a practice traders know very well. The 
problem lies with normal accidents, which are not foreseeable; but even in that case, it might 
be possible to devise some form of hedging. Japan was not able to predict the Fukushima 
disaster, and a long discussion could be had as to whether or not the probability of its 
occurrence had been correctly assessed in devising the practices and regulations for the 
nuclear industry. The country was, however, equipped with a large amount of spare LNG 
regasification capacity which, at least, was able to avert a broader collapse of the national 
economy in the necessary shutdown of nuclear capacity that followed the event. The LNG 
capacity had not been built as part of a hedging strategy, of course, but it worked as such. A 
nuclear disaster was very much outside the central scenario that the Japanese energy market 
expected for the spring of 2011, but what saved the market at least was the existence of LNG 
regasification capacity, which somewhat addressed the possibility that a large chunk of the 
power supply curve could go missing overnight. Japan suffered incalculable losses, and an 
environmental disaster of unprecedented scale, but its economy was not brought to its knees 
by an energy shortage, and this was the key to its speedy recovery. 
Investing outside the central case of our scenarios might prove valuable, especially at a 
systemic level, and this conclusion can to some extent be generalised and applied to some of 
the dynamics analysed in this study. One of the most compelling suggestions offered by 
currently observable evidence is that the resurgence of the gas industry in the US will 
mostly benefit Asian growth, leaving Europe to fix the balance between its own gas supply 
and demand. As has been argued earlier, more LNG capacity in Eastern Europe or, even 
better, streamlining intra-European gas transportation would provide useful optionality. 
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With a civil war ongoing in Ukraine and economic sanctions in place against Russia, the 
situation that is looming beyond the eastern borders of Europe could easily escalate into 
something like what has been defined here as a normal accident; whatever the short-term 
developments, the Russia-Ukraine relationship has been and will remain difficult, so that 
investing in alternative options to Russian gas might prove valuable for Europe. And the 
effect of an energy embargo at any point in the future would certainly be disruptive in the 
immediate term, but might trigger responses on the economic and/or political level which, 
in a longer-term perspective, could in turn lead to beneficial developments – say, precipitate 
a diversification in the sources of European gas supply, and more broadly of the energy mix: 
not all normal accidents are necessarily black swans. Yet, it would be safer to be braced for 
whatever kind of beast this turns out to be. 
Along the same lines, one should not rule out unexpected developments in the energy mix 
in the industrialising world either. The current state of play is that despite the European 
inability to tap into LNG growth, the role of gas in the energy mix is poised to increase both 
in the OECD space and in Asia, including a moderate substitution of coal with gas, within 
time frameworks that will differ between North America, Europe and Asia, depending on 
the levels of industrialisation and the existing energy mix, in a dynamics of first- and 
second-comers. But what if the disruptive potential of China and India’s shale hydrocarbons 
reserves has been underestimated? This could be driven by either new discoveries or 
unexpected technological advancement, the latter reversing the current view that US shale 
technology is either not easily exportable or reproducible. In this picture, the most 
prominent second-comers might even end up overtaking the first-comers, operating a 
massive switch to gas. A scenario in which China sets clear emissions reduction goals in the 
next Five-Year Plan may suddenly become less unlikely than most expect. And even if, 
surely, this development would imply an increase in both Chinese production and 
consumption of gas, the net effect would have to be investigated carefully: like an elephant 
in a china shop, even a small net change might affect the Asian gas price. Should this be a 
downward move, it would also prove a game-changer in the structure of global LNG flows. 
Furthermore, and as a result of the above, what would the carbon price be in this scenario, 
and where would all the displaced coal go in the end? It is time to form solid opinions on 
these questions. The observable reality is that displaced coal will keep heading towards the 
industrialising world, especially to China, but this will be mitigated by the latter’s ability to 
escape Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” by mandating policies favourable to the development 
of an indigenous gas industry and to attracting foreign supply. Should China succeed in 
making a significant move away from coal, identifying the remaining second-comers would 
become an important exercise: one that needs to be performed by industry players in order 
to find out what fuels they will be competing for within the regions where they forecast 
growth (an early hint could be India and Africa), as well as by environmental policy-makers 
in order to find new ways to address the centuries-old riddle that links the first phase of 
industrialisation with dirty sources of energy. Ultimately, since change is brought about in 
part by unknown knowns and in part by normal accidents, winners and losers will be 
constantly redefined according to their ability to visualise the unknown knowns, make solid 
hypotheses on the possible deviations due to normal accidents, and steer their business or 
policy accordingly. 
